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ROBUST NO ARBITRAGE AND THE SOLVABILITY OF VECTOR-VALUED
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROBLEMS
ANDREAS H. HAMEL, BIRGIT RUDLOFF, AND ZHOU ZHOU
Abstract. A market model with d assets in discrete time is considered where trades are subject to
proportional transaction costs given via bid-ask spreads, while the existence of a nume´raire is not
assumed. It is shown that robust no arbitrage holds if, and only if, there exists a Pareto solution for
some vector-valued utility maximization problem with component-wise utility functions. Moreover,
it is demonstrated that a consistent price process can be constructed from the Pareto maximizer.
1. Introduction
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing (FTAP) has been studied extensively in various set-
tings. In the FTAP, the equivalence of no arbitrage (NA) and the existence of an equivalent
(super-)martingale measure is established. In market models with transaction costs, the martingale
measures are usually replaced by consistent pricing systems (or processes). We refer to [1] and the
references therein. There is also a stream of literature (e.g., [2, 7, 8] and the references therein)
on general utility maximization with the presence of a nume´raire in the market. In many papers,
the existence of solutions (maximizers) is established, and one of the common assumptions is the
absence of arbitrage. The easy-to-see fact that the converse is also true is well-known as well,
i.e., the existence of a utility maximizer implies NA. For example, in [3, Section 3.1], the authors
show both directions for a one-period market model without transaction costs which involves a
nume´raire. They show that no arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a solution for some utility
maximization problem. This result goes back to Rogers [10] who actually constructed equivalent
martingale measures from utility maximizers.
The aim of this paper is to provide a corresponding result for market models with propor-
tional transaction costs and a utility maximization problem with component-wise utility functions.
This equivalence result between the existence of Pareto maximizers of a such vector-valued utility
maximization problem and the well-established robust no-arbitrage condition (introduced in [13])
underlines that from a mathematical point of view the very special case of “one utility function for
each asset” is already enough. Moreover, there is some rational to this situation: the interpretation
is that the market model rules the exchange of assets, while “utilities” (the images of a vector-valued
utility function) cannot be exchanged into one another and are therefore compared by means of the
order generated by Rd+ and not a solvency cone (which is usually bigger). It also seems more plau-
sible to have a complete preference for positions of only one asset–instead of a complete preference
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2for portfolio vectors as assumed very often in the literature. Compare [4] where this approach was
initiated.
A financial market in discrete time is considered in which there are d tradable assets. The
existence of a nume´raire is not assumed; instead, following Kabanov [5], the assets are considered
in physical units where the exchange between these assets are subject to proportional transaction
costs. We show that robust no arbitrage holds if, and only if, there exists a solution for some
vector-valued utility maximization problem with respect to the order generated by Rd+ (a Pareto
maximizer). A key step to prove the result is to apply Komlo´s’s theorem to get the closedness of
the set of the vector-valued expected utilities. We also show that a consistent price process can be
constructed from the Pareto maximizer.
The note is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the setup and the main results.
In Section 3, we provide the proofs of the results.
2. The setup and the main result
2.1. Notation and background. We follow the setup in [13]. Let (Ω, (Ft)t=0,... ,T ,P) be a filtered
probability space in discrete time, where T ∈ N is the time horizon, and F0 is assumed to be trivial.
We assume that in the market there are d assets available for exchange. These assets could be
interpreted as currencies, but this restriction is not necessary. The exchange of assets is subject to
proportional transaction costs; we use it in the form of bid-ask processes as discussed in [13].
Definition 2.1. A d× d-matrix Π0 = (π
ij)i,j=1,... ,d is called a bid-ask matrix, if
πij > 0, πii = 1, and πij ≤ πikπkj, ∀i, j, k = 1, . . . , d.
An adapted process Π = (Πt)t=0,... ,T is called a bid-ask process, if Πt(ω) is a bid-ask matrix for any
(t, ω) ∈ {0, . . . , T} × Ω.
In the above definition, the entry πijt in Πt denotes the number of units of asset i an investor
needs in order to buy one unit of asset j at time t. That is, the bid-ask spread of asset i in terms
of asset j is given by {1/πjit , π
ij
t } at time t.
For the bid-ask matrix Π0 = (πij), let −K(Π0) be the convex cone generated by the vectors
{−ei,−πijei + ej , i, j = 1, . . . , d}, where ei = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with the i-th component equal
to 1. In other words, −K(Π0) represents the set of portfolios available starting from initial position
0 ∈ Rd for the assets. Denote K∗(Π0) as the polar of the cone −K(Π0). That is,
K∗(Π0) := {w ∈ R
d : 〈v,w〉 ≤ 0, ∀v ∈ −K(Π0)},
where 〈·, ·〉 represents the inner product. For any bid-ask process Π = (Πt)t=0,... ,T , similar definitions
apply for −K(Πt(ω)) and K
∗(Πt(ω)), (t, ω) ∈ {0, . . . , T} × Ω.
Let us recall the definition of self-financing portfolios in [13].
Definition 2.2. An Rd-valued adapted process v = (vt)t=0,... ,T is called a self-financing portfolio
process (from initial position 0) for the bid-ask process Π = (Πt)t=0,... ,T , if for t = 0, . . . , T ,
vt − vt−1 ∈ −K(Πt), a.s.,
3where v−1 ≡ 0. Denote
AΠ := {vT : for some self-financing portfolio process (vt)t=0,... ,T in terms of Π}.
Recall the notion of (robust) no arbitrage introduced in [13].
Definition 2.3. We say NA holds with respect to the bid-ask process Π, if for any vT ∈ AΠ, if
vT ≥ 0 a.s. then vT = 0 a.s., where the (in)equalities are component-wise. We say NA
r holds
with respect to Π, if there exists a bid-ask process Π˜ = (Π˜t)t with smaller bid-ask spreads (i.e., for
t = 0, . . . , T and i, j = 1, . . . , d, [1/π˜jit , π˜
ij
t ] is contained in the relative interior of [1/π
ji
t , π
ij
t ] a.s.),
such that NA holds with respect to Π˜.
Let us also recall the definition of (strictly) consistent price processes.
Definition 2.4. An Rd+ valued adapted process Z = (Zt)t=0,... ,T is called a consistent (strictly
consistent, respectively) price process for the bid-ask process Π, if Z is a P-martingale, and Zt(·) ∈
K∗t (·) \ {0} (the relative interior of K
∗
t (·), respectively) a.s., t = 0, . . . , T .
For i = 1, . . . , d, let U i : R+ 7→ [−∞,∞) be concave, continuous, strictly increasing, and bounded
from above, representing the utility function for asset i. Define U : Rd+ 7→ R
d,
U(x) = (U1(x1), . . . , Ud(xd)), x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Rd+.
For a given initial endowment x ∈ Rd+, consider the R
d-valued utility maximization problem
maximize EPU(XT ) subject to XT ∈ AΠ(x), (2.1)
where
AΠ(x) := {XT ≥ 0 a.s. : XT ∈ AΠ + x}
and
EPU(XT ) := (EPU
1(X1T ), . . . ,EPU
d(XdT )), XT = (X
1
T , . . . ,X
d
T ) ∈ AΠ(x).
Moreover, we also consider the set
JΠ(U)(x) := {EPU(XT ) : XT ∈ AΠ(x)}.
The meaning of the word “maximize” in (2.1) has to be defined. We will consider two variants.
First, we recall the definition of a Pareto maximizer with respect to the ordering cone Rd+ and a
domination property which is also called (upper) external stability in the literature. For yet another
notion, compare Remark 2.9 below.
Definition 2.5. (a) A point zˆ ∈M is called Pareto maximal for M ⊆ Rd iff
M ∩ (zˆ + Rd+) = {zˆ}.
The set of Pareto maximal points of M is denoted by MaxM .
(b) A set M ⊆ Rd is said to satisfy the upper domination property if for each z ∈ M there is
zˆ ∈MaxM such that z ≤Rd
+
zˆ.
4Definition 2.6. A position XˆT ∈ AΠ(x) is called a Pareto maximizer for (2.1) iff EPU(XˆT ) ∈
Max JΠ(U)(x). The set of Pareto maximizers for (2.1) is denoted by PΠ(U)(x).
One may easily realize that XˆT ∈ PΠ(U)(x) if, and only if, there does not exist XT ∈ AΠ(x),
such that
i) For all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, EPU
i(XiT ) ≥ EPU
i(XˆiT );
ii) For some i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, EPU
i(XiT ) > EPU
i(XˆiT ).
The study of the vector-valued utility maximization problem (2.1) was initiated in [14] and [15],
the former containing a certainty equivalent, the latter duality results in a one-period setup with a
finite probability space which were published in [4]. In [16], the problem is studied with each of the
components of the utility function depending on all the components of the commodity vector in a
deterministic and set-valued framework. In [12], further certainty equivalents as well as indifference
prices are defined also for a finite probability space.
2.2. Main results. The following two results, Proposition 2.7 and Theorem 2.8, establish the
equivalence between no arbitrage and the existence of a Pareto optimizer for (2.1).
Proposition 2.7. Let Π be a bid-ask process. If NAr holds with respect to Π, then JΠ(U)(x)
satisfies the upper domination property. In particular, PΠ(U) 6= ∅.
Conversely, if PΠ(U) 6= ∅, then NA holds with respect to Π.
Theorem 2.8. NAr holds with respect to the bid-ask process Π if, and only if, there exists a bid-ask
process Π˜ with smaller bid-ask spreads satisfying PΠ˜(U) 6= ∅.
Remark 2.9. A comment on the above results might be in order. The function XT 7→ EPU(XT ) can
straightforwardly be extended to a function F mapping into the set G(Rd,−Rd+) := {D ⊆ R
d : D =
cl co (D − Rd+)} by setting
F (XT ) = EPU(XT )−R
d
+.
The pair (G(Rd,−Rd+),⊆) is a complete lattice. The first part of Proposition 2.7 can now be read as
follows: NAr implies the existence of a solution of the set optimization problem (in the complete-
lattice sense, see, e.g., [11, Definition 28, Corollary 2.9])
maximize F (XT ) subject to XT ∈ AΠ(x).
This follows from [11, Proposition 2.15] (adapted to maximization), and in this reference more
material about the treatment of vector optimization as complete lattice-valued problems can be found.
Thus, roughly speaking, Theorem 2.8 yields that robust no arbitrage is equivalent to the existence
of solutions of the complete lattice extension of some vector-valued utility maximization problem.
One should note that the existence of such a solution does not imply the domination property.
Motivated by [3, Corollary 3.10], we also establish the following wo results which provide a
construction of a (strictly) consistent price process from a Pareto maximizer.
5Proposition 2.10. Let NAr hold with respect to the bid-ask process Π and let XˆT ∈ PΠ(U). Assume
that U i is differentiable for all i = 1, . . . , d, and that there exists δ ∈ intRd+ such that XˆT ≥ δ a.s.
Then, there exists (λ1, . . . , λd) ∈ Rd+\{0} such that((
λiEP[(U
i)′(XˆiT )|Ft]
)
i=1,... ,d
)
t=0,... ,T
defines a consistent price process for Π.
Corollary 2.11. Let NAr hold with respect to the bid-ask process Π, and thus NAr still holds with
respect to some Π˜ with smaller bid-ask spreads. Let XˆT ∈ PΠ˜(U). Assume that U
i is differentiable
for all i = 1, . . . , d, and that there exists δ ∈ intRd+ such that XˆT ≥ δ a.s. Then, there exists
(λ1, . . . , λd) ∈ intRd+ such that((
λiEP[(U
i)′(XˆiT )|Ft]
)
i=1,... ,d
)
t=0,... ,T
defines a strictly consistent price process for Π.
3. Proof of the results
Lemma 3.1. Assume NAr holds with respect to Π. Then for any sequence (XnT )n∈N ⊂ AΠ(x),
there exists a subsequence (XnkT )k∈N ⊂ (X
n
T )n∈N and Y ∈ AΠ(x), such that
1
N
N∑
k=1
XnkT → Y a.s., N →∞.
Proof. By [13, Theorem 1.7], there exists a strictly consistent price process (Zt)t=0,... ,T . For i =
1, . . . , d, define
dQi
dP
:=
ZiT
Zi0
.
Then, Qi is a probability measure that is equivalent to P, i = 1, . . . , d. For anyXT = (X
1
T , . . . ,X
d
T ) ∈
AΠ(x), we have that for i = 1, . . . , d,
EQiX
i
T =
1
Zi0
EP[Z
i
TX
i
T ] ≤
1
Zi0
EP〈ZT ,XT 〉 ≤
1
Zi0
〈Z0, x〉, (3.1)
where the second (in)equality follows from the fact that the components of ZT and XT are all
nonnegative a.s., and the third (in)equality follows from [13, Theorem 4.1].
Now, let (XnT )n∈N ⊂ AΠ(x), where X
n
T = (X
n,1
T , . . . ,X
n,d
T ). First, consider the first component,
i.e., the sequence (Xn,1T )n∈N. Since from (3.1)
sup
n∈N
EQX
n,1
T ≤
1
Z10
〈Z0, x〉 <∞,
by Komlo´s’s theorem (see e.g., [6, Theorem 1a]), there exists a subsequence (Xnk ,1T )k∈N ⊂ (X
n,1
T )n∈N
and a random variable Y 1 ∈ FT , such that for any further subsequence (η
j)j∈N ⊂ (X
nk,1
T )k∈N,
1
N
N∑
j=1
ηj → Y 1 a.s., N →∞. (3.2)
6Next, consider the sequence (Xnk,2T )k∈N ⊂ (X
n,2
T )n∈N for the second component. Applying Komlo´s’s
theorem again, we have that there exist a subsequence (X
nk
l
,2
T )l∈N ⊂ (X
nk ,2
T )k∈N and Y
2 ∈ FT , such
that for any further subsequence (ξj)j∈N ⊂ (X
nkl ,2
T )l∈N,
1
N
N∑
j=1
ξj → Y 2 a.s., N →∞.
Obviously, (3.2) still holds if we replace the (Xnk,1T )k∈N with (X
nk
l
,1
T )l∈N. Repeating this process for
the remaining components, we can finally get a subsequence (ζi)i∈N ⊂ (X
n
T )n∈N and an R
d-valued
random variable Y = (Y 1, . . . , Y d) ∈ FT , such that
1
N
N∑
i=1
ζi → Y a.s., N →∞.
SinceAΠ(x) is convex,
1
N
∑N
i=1 ζi ∈ AΠ(x). By [13, Theorem 2.1], AΠ(x) is closed in L
0(Ω,FT ,P;R
d),
and thus Y ∈ AΠ(x). 
Proof of Proposition 2.7. First, let us show the first statement of this proposition. Assume that
NAr holds with respect to Π. It suffices to show that the set JΠ(U)(x) ⊂ R
d is closed. Indeed, if
this is the case, then the set (EPU(XT ) + R
d
+) ∩ JΠ(U)(x) is compact for each XT ∈ AΠ(x) since
U is component-wise bounded from above. Therefore, by [9, Theorem 2(i), page 489], there is a
Pareto maximizer X¯T ∈ AΠ(x) satisfying EPU(XT ) ≤Rd
+
EPU(X¯T ). In particular, PΠ(U) 6= ∅.
In order to show the closedness of JΠ(U)(x), take (X
n
T )n∈N ⊂ AΠ(x), such that
EPU(X
n
T )→ a ∈
(
d∏
i=1
[U i(0),∞)
)
∩Rd.
By Lemma 3.1, there exists a subsequence (XnkT )k∈N and Y ∈ AΠ(x), such that
1
N
N∑
k=1
XnkT → Y a.s., N →∞.
As Ui is concave, i = 1, . . . , d, we have that
EPU
(
1
N
N∑
k=1
XnkT
)
≥
1
N
N∑
k=1
EPU(X
nk
T ),
where the inequality is component-wise. As U is continuous and bounded from above, by Fatou’s
Lemma, one has
EPU(Y ) ≥ a.
BecauseAΠ(x) = (AΠ(x)−L
0(Ω,FT ,P;R
d
+)∩L
0(Ω,FT ,P;R
d
+) and U
i is continuous for i = 1, . . . , d,
there exists Y˜ ∈ AΠ(x), such that EPU(Y˜ ) = a. This completes the proof of the first statement.
Next, let us prove the second statement. Let XˆT ∈ AΠ(x) be a Pareto maximizer for (2.1). If
NA fails with respect to Π, then there would exist some X¯T = (X¯
1
T , . . . , X¯
d
T ) ∈ AΠ, such that
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, X¯iT ≥ 0 a.s.,
7and
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, P{X¯iT > 0} > 0.
Then XˆT + X¯T ∈ AΠ(x), and
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, EPU
i(XˆiT + X¯
i
T ) ≥ EPU
i(XˆiT ),
and
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, EPU
i(XˆiT + X¯
i
T ) > EPU
i(XˆiT ).
This contradicts the Pareto optimality of XˆT . 
Proof of Theorem 2.8. If NAr holds with respect to Π, then there exists Π˜ with smaller bid-ask
spreads, such that NAr also holds with respect to Π˜. By Proposition 2.7 one has PΠ˜(U) 6= ∅.
Conversely, if PΠ˜(U) 6= ∅ for some Π˜ with smaller bid-ask spreads, then by Proposition 2.7 NA
holds with respect to Π˜, and thus NAr holds with respect to Π. 
Proof of Proposition 2.10. Since XˆT is a Pareto optimizer for (2.1), by [9, Proposition 9, page
497] there exists λ = (λ1, . . . , λd) ∈ Rd+\{0}, such that XˆT is also optimal for the scalar-valued
maximization problem
sup
XT∈AΠ(x)
〈λ,EPU(XT )〉. (3.3)
Fix t ∈ {0, . . . , T}. Let ut be an R
d-valued Ft-measurable random variable satisfying ut(·) ∈
−K(Πt(·)) and ut(·) ≥ −δ/2 a.s. Since XˆT + ǫut ∈ AΠ(x) for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and XˆT is optimal for
(3.3), we have that
〈λ,EPU(XˆT + ǫut)〉 − 〈λ,EPU(XˆT )〉 ≤ 0.
Then
d∑
i=1
λiEP
[
U i(XˆiT + ǫu
i
t)− U
i(XˆiT )
ǫ
]
≤ 0.
Letting ǫց 0 and applying the dominated convergence theorem, we get that
d∑
i=1
λiEP
[
uit · (U
i)′(XˆiT )
]
≤ 0.
Therefore,
EP
[
d∑
i=1
λiEP
[
(U i)′(XˆiT )|Ft
]
uit
]
≤ 0. (3.4)
Let us show that(
λ1EP
[
(U1)′(Xˆ1T )|Ft
]
, . . . , λdEP
[
(Ud)′(XˆdT )|Ft
])
(·) ∈ K∗(Πt(·)), a.s.
Indeed, if the above fails to be true, then there exists an Ft-measurable w¯t(·) ∈ −K(Πt(·)) such
that
P
{
d∑
i=1
(
λiEP
[
(U i)′(XˆiT )|Ft
]
· w¯it
)
> 0
}
> 0.
8Then there exists c > 0 such that
P
{
cw¯t > −δ/2,
d∑
i=1
(
λiEP
[
(U i)′(XˆiT )|Ft
]
· cw¯it
)
> 0
}
> 0.
Denote the set in the above as B. If we replace ut in (3.4) by w˜t := cw¯t1B , then the inequality
(3.4) fails, which yields a contradiction. 
Proof of Corollary 2.11. The result follows from Proposition 2.10 and [13, Proposition A.5]. 
Contribution of the authors. The first author conjectured the results of this paper (in form of
Proposition 2.7 and Remark 2.9); this conjecture is already mentioned in [14,15] supervised by the
first author regarding the content. The equivalence problem for solutions of vector-utility functions
and (robust) no arbitrage for markets with transaction costs was among the open problems given
by the first author to the second for discussion at the AMS Mathematics Research Community 2015
in Financial Mathematics. The collaboration of the second and the third author at this summer
school led to the proof of this conjecture.
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